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ABSTRACT. Real estate developers in China are using mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to ensure 
their survival and competitiveness. However, no suitable method is yet available to assess whether 
such M&As provide enhanced value for those involved. Using a hybrid method of data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) and Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) indices, this paper evaluates the short 
and medium term effects of M&As on acquirers’ economic performance with a set of 32 M&A cases oc-
curring during 2000–2011 in China. The results of the analysis show that M&As generally have a posi-
tive effect on acquirers’ economic performance. Acquisitions on average experienced a steady growth in 
developer Malmquist TFP, a more progressive adoption of technology immediately after acquisition, a 
slight short-term decrease in technical efficiency after acquisition but followed by a marked increase in 
the longer term once the integration and synergy benefits were realised. However, there is no evidence 
to show whether developers achieved any short or long term scale efficiency improvements after M&A. 
The findings of this study provide useful insights on developer M&A performance from an efficiency 
and productivity perspective.
KEYWORDS: Mergers and acquisitions; Real estate; Developers; Efficiency; Total factor productivity; 
China
1. INTRODUCTION
Real estate is China’s fastest-growing industry 
as its formation and development follows China’s 
economic reform in the 1980’s (Choi 1998). Since 
2004, the Chinese government has enacted a series 
of macro-economic regulatory policies to mitigate 
the risk of a real estate bubble. This has resulted 
in a wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of 
developers in the industry, and both the number 
of deals and volume of developer M&As have in-
creased sharply since 2006 (see Table 1), making 
the industry one of the most M&A active in China 
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Table 1. Chinese real estate M&A deals from 2006 to 2011 (Jan to Feb)
year no. of deals no. of deals  
(disclosed)
M&A amount  
(US $M)
Average M&A amount 
(US $M)
2006 3 3 160.28 53.43
2007 3 3 1540.42 513.47
2008 4 2 512.00 256.00
2009 20 20 2971.80 148.59
2010 84 75 2582.44 34.43
2011 (Jan–Feb) 22 22 1149.87 52.27
Total 136 125 8916.81 71.33
Source: Zero2IPo group (2011)
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today. However, it is not yet clear whether devel-
oper M&As lead to better post-acquisition perfor-
mance or not.
The most commonly used methods to evaluate 
M&A performance in the business domain include 
event studies, cash flow analysis and market value 
frontiers (Franks, Harris 1989; Healy et al. 1992; 
Sudarsanam et al. 1996; Mitchell et al. 2004). 
However, as Antoniou and Zhao (2011) point out, 
these methods are unable to provide meaningful 
insights or usable information on the extent to 
which M&As create value. Furthermore, in order 
to evaluate the M&A performance, a single factor 
(e.g. cash flow, value added) is not enough to com-
pare the acquirers’ performance before and after a 
M&A. Multiple inputs and outputs should be con-
sidered for a comprehensive evaluation.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a power-
ful methodology for assessing the relative efficien-
cies of multi-input and multi-output production 
units. Established by Charnes et al. (1978) based 
on the work of Farrell (1957), DEA has the advan-
tage of not needing to select a particular functional 
form, make distributional assumptions or set the 
relative weights of variables. It has good statisti-
cal characteristics and is a very convenient method 
for detecting efficiency and productivity changes 
in individual organisations (Charnes et al. 1978; 
Cooper et al. 2007a, 2008b), making it very suita-
ble for evaluating and comparing the performance 
of developer M&As.
However, DEA measures the efficiency and pro-
ductivity of decision units for a specific period of 
time and does not allow any analysis of changes 
over time. Meanwhile, the Malmquist total factor 
productivity (TFP) indices can help evaluate the 
total factor productivity change of a particular or-
ganisation over a fixed period, although it could 
be applied equally well in other areas (Caves et al. 
1982; Färe et al. 1994a,b; Cooper et al. 2007b; Korte-
lainen 2008). Malmquist indices have several desir-
able features and properties: (1) there is no need to 
make behavioural assumptions, such as cost mini-
misation or profit maximisation, which makes them 
useful when the producer’s objectives differ, or are 
unknown or are unachieved; (2) no need to provide 
price information, which makes the indices of practi-
cal use when either prices do not exist, are distorted 
or have little economic meaning; and (3) they can 
easily be calculated by the DEA methodology (Caves 
et al. 1982; Färe et al. 1998). All these issues make 
the DEA-based Malmquist TFP Index very suitable 
for evaluating M&A induced performance changes 
as a result of real estate acquisitions.
The purpose of this study is, therefore, to es-
tablish the extent to which developer M&As in-
crease the acquirers’ economic performance using 
the DEA-based Malmquist TFP Index. The next 
section develops and explains the DEA-Malmquist 
method for assessing developer M&A performance. 
This is followed by an illustration of the method 
and test on a set of 32 Chinese developer M&As 
between 2000–2011. The results of the analysis 
are then presented prior to some concluding re-
marks.
2. REVIEW OF POST-ACQUISITION 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Many studies have examined the stock returns of 
acquisitions to investigate the effect of M&A trans-
actions on acquisitions. The event-study methodol-
ogy, first proposed by Fama et al. (1969) is often 
used. This focuses on the long-term (e.g. one to 
five year) effect following an event (e.g., a takeo-
ver) and can provide key evidence concerning mar-
ket efficiency (Brown, Warner 1980; Fama 1991). 
However, the event-study methodology has several 
shortcomings. Firstly, for a long-term event study 
it is more difficult to isolate the takeover effects 
from many other strategic and operational deci-
sions or changes in the financial policy arising in 
the long term. Secondly, benchmark performance 
often suffers from measurement or statistical prob-
lems (Barber, Lyon 1997). For example, according 
to Barber and Lyon (1997), cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR), which is often used to investigate 
the effect of extraneous events on stock prices by 
calculating the sum of all the differences between 
the expected returns and the actual returns up to 
a given point in time, is a biased predictor for long-
term event studies.
Two other main methods of assessing and 
calibrating post-event risk-adjusted performance 
have been adopted in the past to measure long-
run abnormal stock returns: a characteristic-based 
matching approach and Jensen’s alpha approach, 
which is also known as the calendar time portfolio 
approach (Fama 1998; Eckbo et al. 2000; Mitchell, 
Stafford 2000). However, despite extensive studies 
of these two types of long-term event study meth-
ods, there is still no clear preference (Kothari, 
Warner 2005). Both have low power against eco-
nomically interesting null hypotheses and neither 
is immune from misspecification (Jegadeesh, Karc-
eski 2004). Considering these power and specifica-
tion problems, the challenge of refining long-term 
event methods remains (Kothari, Warner 2005).
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3. THE DEA-MALMQUIST METHOD
3.1. Selection of performance evaluation 
indicators (inputs and outputs)
In order to select appropriate input and output 
indicators for performance evaluation, a close ex-
amination of the real estate industry in China 
is required. Real estate development is a capital 
intensive industry that demands huge financial 
commitments to cover the high price of land ac-
quisition and substantial expenditure in the con-
struction process. This implies that one of the first 
requirements of a developer is a strong financial 
capability. To reflect this, the equity ratio (input 1) 
was selected as it reflects the financing capability 
and capital structure of the organisation. Accord-
ingly, the stockholders return ratio (output 1) is 
adopted as an output indicator for assessing the 
contribution of capital input.
Furthermore, the production process of the 
real estate industry involves a long period of time 
and massive capital investment. Although prop-
erty project presales can produce some capital 
in advance, developers still need to access fur-
ther finance through other channels for the large 
amount of capital needed to cover construction 
costs. Therefore, the quick ratio (output 2), which 
measures the ability of an organisation to use its 
liquid capital to immediately overcome its current 
liabilities, is also adopted as an output indicator.
As property is expensive, the customers’ pur-
chasing intentions are normally influenced by 
their expected income and attitude towards future 
economic prospects. Developers, on the other hand, 
need to formulate appropriate operation strategies 
depending on the economic situation. To reflect the 
impact of this, inventory turnover (input 2) – rep-
resenting the property selling condition and re-
sources commitment – is used as an input indica-
tor. Return on sales (output 3) is the corresponding 
output indicator.
In China’s real estate industry, land is gener-
ally regarded as a core production material and 
long-term asset, and developers always experience 
fierce competition and need a substantial amount 
of capital commitment for its purchase. To raise 
the funds needed, developers generally use land as 
a mortgage tool for obtaining quick cash. Addition-
ally, developers in China use presales (such as a 
20% to 30% down payment) to lower investment 
barriers for individuals and appeal to more con-
sumers to buy properties. By using these methods, 
developers improve their cash flow and transfer 
the risks involved in money collection to financial 
institutions such as banks. To reflect this aspect 
of developer performance, the receivable turnover 
ratio (input 3) is adopted as an input indicator, 
with the cash flow ratio (output 4) as an output 
indicator.
Finally, due to the ferocity of competition, de-
velopers need to compete in price, quality, service, 
product delivery, etc. Specifically, requirements 
such as vast investment resources and long con-
struction periods make the profitability of develop-
ers particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the 
economic environment and the market. To reflect 
the effect of market competition on developer per-
formance, the return of assets (output 5) is used as 
an output indicator.
In short, three input indicators (Stockholder 
Equity Ratio, Inventory Turnover and Receivable 
Turnover Ratio) and five output indicators (Return 
on Equity, Return on Sales, Quick Ratio, Cash 
Flow Ratio and Return on Assets) are used in the 
analysis. It should be noted that all the output in-
dictors are related to economic performance, and 
it is not the intention to investigate social or envi-
ronmental performance at this stage.
3.2. DEA efficiency estimation
DEA is a modern frontier analysis method for ef-
ficiency estimation, comprising technical efficiency, 
pure technical, allocative, scale, cost and revenue 
efficiency (Cooper et al 2007b). The efficient value 
range is from 0 to 1, where 1 is regarded as the 
most efficient. In this paper, technical efficiency, 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency are 
used to measure acquirer efficiency. Technical ef-
ficiency is measured by using an input-oriented 
model (Shepherd 1970). Assume Decision Making 
Unit (DMU) i uses M inputs tix  to generate N out-
puts tiy  in period t. The production technology of 
period t can be modelled by an input function. For 
any ( )N ,   t t try V y+  denotes the subset of all in-
put vectors t Mx +  which yield at least   ty , using 
a production technology characterised by returns 
to scale of type r, where r = c = constant returns 
to scale (CRS), r = v = variable returns to scale 
(VRS), and r = n = non-increasing returns to scale 
(nIRS). The input-oriented distance function is:
( ) ( ), sup : ,  
s
it s s s s t s
r ri i i i is
i
x
D x y y V y
   = θ  θ   

( ){ }( ) 1inf : ,s s s si i i ix y −= θ θ , (1)
where: ( ),s si ix y  is the input and output vector for 
DMU i during period s.
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Technical efficiency ( ),   t t tr i iTE x y is thus defined 
as ( ) ( )  , 1 / ,t t t t t tr ri i i iTE x y D x y= . CRS technical ef-
ficiency is measured for each DMU by solving a 
linear programming problem:
( )( ) ( )1, , mint s s t t t tc ci i i i iD x y TE x y− = = θ , (2)
Subject to: t t ti iY yλ ≥ ,
t t t t
i i iX xλ ≤ θ  and
0 tiλ ≥ ,
where: tX  is a M I×  input matrix and tY  an
 N I×  output matrix for all DMUs; tiλ  is an 1I ×  
intensity vector; and  I  = the number of DMUs in 
the sample (i = 1,2, ...,  I ). This estimation (with 
the tiλ  constrained to be non-negative) generates 
a CRS frontier.
Technical efficiency can be divided into pure tech-
nical efficiency ( )  ,t t tv i iTE x y  (technical efficiency rela-
tive to a VRS frontier) and scale efficiency ( )  ,t t ti iSE x y , 
as ( ) ( ) ( ), , , . t t t t t t t t tc vi i i i i iTE x y TE x y SE x y=  These are 








λ =∑  for a VRS frontier, 







λ ≤∑  for a nIRS fron-
tier. Pure technical efficiency is the solution to 
the VRS problem, and scale efficiency is then ob-
tained by ( ) ( ) ( ), , / ,t t t t t t t t tc vi i i i i iSE x y TE x y TE x y= . If
( )  , 1t t ti iSE x y = , CRS are indicated. If ( ), 1t t ti iSE x y ≠  
and NIRS efficiency =   tvTE , DRS are indicated; if 
( ), 1t t ti iSE x y ≠  and NIRS efficiency   tvTE≠  then 
IRS are present.
3.3. DEA-based Malmquist analysis of 
productivity
The Malmquist index approach is adopted to meas-
ure the total factor productivity (TFP) change of 
DMUs over time. The description below draws pri-
marily upon the work of Färe et al. (1994a, 1998) 
and recaps some of the discussion from Coelli et al. 
(2005). The Malmquist TFP change index (output-
orientated) between period s (the start period) and 
period t is given by (Caves et al. 1982).
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The distance function ( )0 , infs s sD x y =  
( ){ }: , /s s sx y S∅ ∅ ∈  is defined as the reciprocal of the “maximum” proportional expansion of the out-
put vector ys in given inputs xs. Similarly, the dis-
tance function ( ) ( ){ }s0 , inf : , /s t tt tD x y x y S= ∅ ∅ ∈  
represents the distance from period t to the period 
s technology. A value of M0 larger than one means 
that the TFP grows from period s to period t, oth-
erwise a decline in TFP is indicated.
By rearranging function 3, the TFP index can 
be decomposed into the product of the technical 
change index and the technical efficiency change 
index as:
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In equation (4), the ratio outside the square 
brackets is actually the efficiency change (EC), 
which evaluates the change in the output-oriented 
measure of Farrell technical efficiency between pe-















The remaining part of equation (4) concerns 
technical change (TC), which measures the geo-
metric mean of the shift in technology between the 
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Furthermore, Färe et al. (1994b) decomposed 
technical efficiency change into “pure” technical 
efficiency change and scale efficiency change. The 
















and the scale efficiency change (SEC) is written as:
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )












v t t c t t
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v s s c s s
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v t t c t t
s s
v s s c s s
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The SEC is actually the geometric mean of two 
SEC measures relative to period t and s technology 
respectively.
The Malmquist TFP index (distance measures) 
in equation (3) can be calculated by using a DEA-
like linear programming methodology (Färe et al. 
1994a). For the organisation i-th, four distance 
functions need to be calculated to measure the 
TFP change between two periods. These four dis-
tances can be obtained by the four linear program-
ming problems (equations 9–12):
( )
−




,t t t maxD x y , (9)
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st 0 it Tx X−∅ + λ ≥ ,
0it ty Y− λ ≥ ,
0λ ≥ ,
( ) 10 ,,s s sD x y max
−
∅ λ  = ∅  , (10)
st 0 is Sx X−∅ + λ ≥ ,
0is sy Y− λ ≥ ,
0λ ≥ ,
( ) 10 ,,t s tD x y max
−
∅ λ  = ∅  , (11)
st 0 is Tx X−∅ + λ ≥ ,
0is ty Y− λ ≥ ,
0λ ≥ ,
and
( ) 10 ,,s t tD x y max
−
∅ λ  = ∅  , (12)
st 0 it Sx X−∅ + λ ≥ ,
0it sy Y− λ ≥ ,
0λ ≥ ,
where: θ is a scalar and λ is a I×l vector of constants. 
The value of θ is the efficiency score for the i-th or-
ganisation. To calculate the PEC index (equation 
7) and the SEC index (equation 8), two additional 
lPs are required on the basis of the lPs 9 and10 
respectively, with only the convexity restriction 
(Πλ=l) added to each. The DEAP version 2.1 is used 
to evaluate the DEA and Malmquist index. Details 
of DEAP version 2.1 are provided in Coelli (1996).
3.4. Estimation windows
To compare the value of the Malmquist TFP index 
before and after acquisition, three estimation win-
dows are established that include four time points 
such as one year prior to acquisition (t – 1), acqui-
sition announcement (t + 0), one year after acquisi-
tion (t + 1) and three years after acquisition (t + 3). 
The two windows: window (1) from (t – 1) to (t + 
1); and window (2) from (t – 1) to (t + 3) represent 
the short-term and relatively long-term windows 
of the M&As respectively.
4. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE AND TESTING
4.1. Data sources and sampling
M&A transactions are identified from the Thom-
son Financial Securities Data’s SDC and Bloomb-
erg database. For the Chinese real estate indus-
try, M&A information can be obtained from (1) the 
China Real Estate Industry Research Database, 
and (2) the China-listed Firm’s Merger & Acqui-
sition Dataset. A total of 32 Chinese developer 
M&As cases were selected at random according to 
the following criteria: (1) there must be a transfer 
of ownership between acquirers and their targets; 
(2) acquirers are from the real estate industry; 
(3) their operation and financial data are available 
in the databases.
4.2. Summary statistics
The financial operational indicators of acquirers 
and target developers are summarised in Table 3, 
which provides a general background and context 
of the sample cases’ performances. This shows that 
acquirers are 2.77, 2.35, 3.51 and 2.25 times larger 
than the target developers on total assets, debt, 
cash and market value respectively. In contrast, 
the acquirers have relatively smaller financial lev-
erage, Tobin’s Q, Cash & growth, return on equity, 
and return on assets. This first indicates that the 
management efficiency and profitability of the tar-
Table 2. operational indicators of acquirer and target developers
Items Acquirers Targets Difference:  
acquirer/targetMean Min Max Mean Min Max
Total assets (yuan) 9.07E + 09 3.63E + 07 5.98E + 10 3.28E + 09 610441 5.48E + 10 2.77
Debt (yuan) 5.63E + 09 1.59E + 07 3.95E + 10 2.40E + 09 514617 3.35E + 10 2.35
Cash (yuan) 1.40E + 09 3993385 8.92E + 09 3.99E + 08 –2.31E + 08 6.03E + 09 3.51
Market value (Yuan) 1.15E + 10 1.77E + 08 6.76E + 10 5.12E + 09 71642.25 5.48E + 10 2.25
Financial leverages 11.8840 1.6700 74.3200 12.2216 0.0073 58.3294 0.97
Tobin’s’ Q 2.9390 1.5500 7.0700 5.2771 1.5615 37.0533 0.56
Cash & growth 0.3963 0.0800 1.4700 2.2948 0.0426 37.1513 0.17
Return on equity 0.1150 0.0000 0.4400 0.1885 0.0198 0.8881 0.61
Return on assets 0.0588 0.0000 0.3600 0.0792 0.0019 0.3585 0.74
Note: Tobin’s Q is an indicator generally used to measure the management efficiency of organisations (Lang et al. 
1989; Servaes 1991; Chung, Pruitt 1994). Tobin’s Q = (the organisation’s market value + liquidation value of pre-
ferred stock DEBT)/ Total assets; If T’s Q less than one, an inefficient management is indicated. Cash & growth 
is a useful indicator to identify any agent problems (Jensen 1986; lang et al. 1991). High levels of cash flow, but 
low growth opportunities imply the presence of an agency problem.
Measuring the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the economic performance of real estate developers 363
get developers is much higher than that of the ac-
quirers in the sample. Second, it clearly shows that 
that the M&As generally occur between acquirers 
with a large business scale and target developers 
with high managerial efficiency and profitability.
The information relating to the input and out-
put indicators is summarised in Table 4. For the 
input indicators, the equity ratio increased slightly 
from 0.36 in t – 1 to 0.38 in t – 3, indicating an 
increased capital commitment from acquirers af-
ter acquisition. The acquirers’ average inventory 
turnover decreased significantly from 0.94 in pe-
riod t – 1 to 0.44 in period t + 3. The receivables 
turnover ratio decreased dramatically from 227 to 
117 from t – 1 to t + 1, but then increased slightly 
to 241 in t + 3. In terms of output indicators, both 
ROE and ROS increased significantly from the 
pre-acquisition to post-acquisition phase. The ac-
quirer’s average quick ratio experienced little fluc-
tuation from t – 1 to t + 3. Conversely, the cash 
flow ratio was highly volatile during the same pe-
riod. Finally, there was a substantial rise in the 
acquirers’ average return on assets from t – 1 to 
t + 3, increasing to a mean 0.06 in the short term 
and 0.04 in the longer term. All in all, the selected 
input and output indicators mainly show a trend 
of better financial performance of the sample cases 
after the M&As with five out of eight indicators 
recording an increased value. of the other three 
indicators, one has only a slight decrease from 0.69 
at t – 1 to 0.68 at t + 1, with the remaining two in 
an obvious relative decline.
The efficiency of acquirers measured by the DEA 
method is illustrated in Table 5. Their average tech-
nical efficiency decreased significantly from 0.93 in 
t – 1 to 0.74 in t + 3, with the lowest being 0.72 
in t + 1. This means that technical efficiency de-
clined sharply in the short-term after acquisition, 
but recovered slightly since the realisation of the 
synergy and integration benefits of M&A in longer 
term. Similarly, pure technical efficiency sharply 
declined from 0.94 to 0.81 during t – 1 to t + 1, but 
rose to 0.86 in t + 3. In contrast, scale efficiency ex-
perienced a continual decline in both the short and 
long-term, dropping gradually from 0.98 to 0.85 – 
implying that no economies of scale were achieved.
Table 3. Input and output indicators (32 samples)
Items t – 1 t + 0 t + 1 t + 3
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Equity ratio 0.36 –0.79 0.89 0.36 –0.74 0.75 0.39 0.21 0.75 0.38 0.18 0.71
Inventory turnover 0.94 0.03 6.55 0.67 0.14 3.48 0.49 0.02 2.31 0.44 0 3.76
Receivables turnover 
ratio
227 1 5270 139 4 1990 117 2 1098 241 3 2141
Return of equity –0.06 –1.5 0.33 0.12 0 0.44 0.12 0 0.55 0.11 -0.02 0.38
Return on sales 0.23 –0.44 0.51 0.26 0.09 0.44 0.32 0.07 0.71 0.3 0.08 0.56
Quick ratio 0.69 0.08 2.11 0.58 0.1 1.45 0.72 0.09 2.33 0.68 0.22 1.79
Cash flow ratio –0.04 –1.37 0.78 0.04 –0.89 1.79 –0.13 –1.19 0.75 –0.1 –0.45 0.45
Return of assets 0.02 –0.23 0.15 0.06 0 0.36 0.05 0 0.31 0.04 –0.01 0.1
Table 4. Efficiency of acquirers in different periods (32 samples)
organization Technical efficiency Pure technical efficiency Scale efficiency
t – 1 t + 0 t + 1 t + 3 t – 1 t + 0 t + 1 t + 3 t – 1 t + 0 t + 1 t + 3
1 0.94 0.83 0.62 0.53 0.99 0.92 0.67 0.70 0.96 0.90 0.93 0.76
2 0.90 1.00 0.65 0.48 0.91 1.00 0.69 0.65 0.98 1.00 0.95 0.74
3 1.00 0.62 0.61 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.81 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.75 0.75
4 0.89 1.00 0.50 0.42 0.97 1.00 0.52 0.58 0.92 1.00 0.97 0.73
5 1.00 1.00 0.58 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.59 0.85 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.92
6 0.94 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.79 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.86 1.00 1.00
7 1.00 0.77 1.00 0.36 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.77 1.00 0.44
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.59 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.83 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.71
9 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
10 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.49 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.84
11 0.64 0.76 0.66 0.51 0.65 0.78 0.68 0.69 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.73
12 0.86 0.90 0.75 0.56 0.91 0.96 0.78 0.76 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.73
(Continued)
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4.3. Productivity measuring result analysis
The Malmquist TFP index of each acquirer is provid-
ed in Table 6. In terms of average value during t – 0 
to t + 3, 17 organisations had TFP growth, while the 
remaining 15 experienced a decline in productivity. 
Acquirer 29, with a TFP index of 2.24 (TEC * TC = 1 
* 2.24) had the most productivity growth – attributed 
to considerable technical improvement after acqui-
sition - with other indices such as TEC, PEC and 
SEC remaining unchanged. In contrast, Acquirer 8 
and Acquirer 4 had the poorest performance, with a 
mean TFP of 0.66. Both these organisations experi-
enced a dramatic decrease in technical efficiency and 
technology during acquisition. other acquirers’ per-
formance can be understood in a similar way based 
on the TFP index changes. For example, Acquirers 
15, 16 and 20 experienced TFP increases for periods 
t + 0, t + 1 and t + 3 respectively, implying a short-
term productivity growth through the M&A but re-
ducing in the long-term. Acquirer 29’s TEC of 1.32 
(TEC = PEC * SEC = 1.12 * 1.17) indicates that its 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency had both 
also made some progress.
It is noticeable that the mean Malmquist TFP 
index is highest (1.26) in the M&A year (t + 0), and 
then decreased significantly to 0.81 in the following 
year (t + 1). In the longer term after acquisition (t 
+ 3), the acquirers’ mean TFP improved slightly to 
1.02. The reasons for these changes can be identified 
from the TEC and TC perspectives: The acquirers’ 
technology had the largest upgrade in t + 0, with a 
slight increase at t + 1 and followed by a slight de-
crease by t + 3. In contrast, the mean technical effi-
ciency of the acquirers markedly declined in both t + 
0 (0.96) and t + 1 (0.79), but rose in t + 3 (1.03). This 
clearly suggests, therefore, that the M&As improved 
acquirers’ technology in the short-term was due to 
a greater commitment of resources, but the growth 
began to diminish in the longer term as the effect of 
the M&As on resource investment weakened. Mean-
while, technical efficiency decreased in t + 0 and t + 
1 because of organisational transition in the short-
term while, in the longer term, technical efficiency 
increased as the synergy and integration benefits 
were realised. Similarly, PEC can be interpreted in 
the same way as TEC. Surprisingly, neither short 
nor long term increases in scale efficiencies were 
realised after the M&As, which is consistent with 
previous scale efficiency analysis results. The reason 
for this is probably due to the real estate industry’s 
unique characteristics of localisation and unmovable 
products.
organization Technical efficiency Pure technical efficiency Scale efficiency
t – 1 t + 0 t + 1 t + 3 t – 1 t + 0 t + 1 t + 3 t – 1 t + 0 t + 1 t + 3
(Continued)
13 1.00 0.89 0.78 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.78 1.00
14 1.00 1.00 0.64 0.62 1.00 1.00 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.62
15 1.00 0.97 0.41 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.91 1.00
16 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86
17 1.00 1.00 0.70 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.80 1.00
18 0.93 1.00 0.80 0.67 0.94 1.00 0.92 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.90
19 0.51 0.57 0.37 0.29 0.54 0.63 0.50 0.49 0.96 0.91 0.74 0.59
20 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.55 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.82
21 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.62 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.00
22 1.00 0.73 0.57 0.72 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.75 1.00 0.73 0.87 0.97
23 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.96
24 0.65 0.91 0.62 0.74 0.71 0.96 0.66 0.79 0.91 0.95 0.93 0.94
25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
26 1.00 0.52 0.53 0.93 1.00 0.82 0.89 0.97 1.00 0.64 0.60 0.95
27 0.56 0.57 0.34 1.00 0.62 0.68 0.60 1.00 0.91 0.83 0.57 1.00
28 1.00 1.00 0.62 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.82 1.00 1.00 0.68 0.79
29 1.00 1.00 0.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 1.00
30 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
31 0.96 0.80 0.81 0.69 1.00 0.81 1.00 0.85 0.96 0.98 0.81 0.82
32 1.00 1.00 0.44 0.68 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.92 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.74
Mean 0.93 0.89 0.72 0.74 0.94 0.95 0.81 0.86 0.98 0.94 0.89 0.85
Max 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Min 0.51 0.52 0.34 0.29 0.54 0.63 0.45 0.49 0.91 0.62 0.57 0.44
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5. CONCLUSION
This paper uses a synthesis of DEA and Malmquist 
index methods to investigate the efficiency and 
productivity changes of real estate acquirers, as 
illustrated and tested with a sample of 32 M&A 
cases from the Chinese real estate industry. The 
statistical analysis indicates that the industry has 
been experiencing a “big fish eats fingerling” style 
of acquisition, in which big developers with large 
amounts of cash acquire target developers with 
high development potential. The analysis shows 
that the financial performance of most of the sam-
ple acquirers improved after the M&As. For those 
that experienced poorer performance after the 
M&As, the major reason appears to be inefficient 
management during their transitional integration. 
The productivity analysis indicates a trend of bet-
ter performance after the M&As, which is consist-
ent with the result of the statistical analysis and 
provide a clear answer to the research question of 
this paper.
However, the results of the efficiency analy-
sis present a slightly different picture. on the 
one hand, technology adoption increases in the 
short-term immediately after the M&As, due to 
the newly inputted resources at that time, but 
gradually declines as the new technology beds in. 
On the other hand, technical efficiency decreases 
immediately after the M&As, which is probably 
due to inefficient management of the integration 
process needed as a result of the M&As, then it 
increases gradually over time when the integration 
of the transition becomes more smooth. Further-
more, no economies of scale were found from the 
results of the efficiency analysis, which neverthe-
less provided a number of practical implications. 
First, it is suggested that the acquirers maintain 
a continuous investment in technology after the 
M&As in order to enable a consistent level of tech-
nical commitment. Second, integration should be 
managed more efficiently in order to speed up the 
transitional process for improved technical effi-
ciency. Finally, as M&As are not able to positively 
affect economies of scale, other means, such as bet-
ter marketing performance or better procurement, 
should be applied.
Overall, the findings of this research reflect the 
characteristics of the real estate industry in China 
in that M&As provide a number of value-enhanc-
ing results for acquirers, but with no significant 
economies of scale due to increased organisation 
size. It should be pointed out that the results of the 
analysis depend on the selection of specific inputs 
and outputs indicators and it is therefore possible 
to obtain different results by changing the input 
and output indicators used. Additionally, the se-
lection of different sample cases may also result 
in different outcomes. As there are more than 100 
China real estate M&As cases from 2006 to 2011, 
the detailed findings from the 32 sample cases may 
not necessarily generalise to the China’s real estate 
industry overall. nevertheless, the method used in 
this paper provides a useful and valid measure of 
developer M&A performance from an efficiency 
and productivity perspective and provides valu-
able insights on the general consequences of M&A 
decisions in the real estate industry in China and 
elsewhere.
REFERENCES
Antoniou, A. P.; Zhao, H. 2011. Measuring the eco-
nomic gains of mergers and acquisitions: is it time 
for a change?, The Capco Institute Journal of Fi-
nancial Transformation 32: 159–168. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.579841
Barber, B. M.; Lyon, J. D. 1997. Detecting long-run 
abnormal stock returns: the empirical power and 
specification of test statistics, Journal of Financial 
Economics 43: 341–372. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
S0304-405X(96)00890-2
Brown, S.; Warner, J. 1980. Measuring security price 
performance, Journal of Financial Economics 8: 205–
258. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(80)90002-1
Caves, D. W.; Christensen, L. R.; Diewert, W. E. 1982. 
The economic theory of index numbers and the meas-
urement of input, output and productivity, Economet-
rica 50: 1393–1414. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1913388
Charnes, A.; Cooper, W. W.; Rhodes, E. 1978. Measur-
ing the efficiency of decision making units, European 
Journal of Operational Research 2: 429–444. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/0377-2217(78)90138-8
Choi, S. 1998. A housing market in the making, China 
Business Review 25(6): 14–19.
Chung, K. H.; Pruitt, S. W. 1994. A simple approxima-
tion of Tobin’s Q, Financial Management 23(3): 70–
74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3665623
Cooper, W. W.; Seiford, L. M.; Tone, K. 2007a. Data en-
velopment analysis: a comprehensive text with mod-
els, applications, references and Dea-Solver software. 
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Cooper, W. W.; Lewin, Y.; Seiford, L. M. (Eds.). 2007b. 
Data envelopment analysis: theory, methodology and 
applications. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Coelli, T. J. 1996. A guide to DEAP Version 2.1: a data 
envelopment analysis (computer) program, CEPA 
Working Paper 96/08. Department of Econometrics, 
University of new England, Armidale.
Coelli, T.; Rao, D. S. P.; O’Donnel, C. J.; Battese, 
g. E. 2005. An introduction to efficiency and produc-
tivity analysis. 2nd ed. New York: Springer.
Measuring the effects of mergers and acquisitions on the economic performance of real estate developers 367
Eckbo, B.; Masulis, R.; Norli, O. 2000. Seasoned pub-
lic offerings: resolution of the ‘new Issues Puz-
zle’, Journal of Financial Economics 56: 251–291. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00041-6
Fama, E.; Fisher, l.; Jensen, M.; Roll, R. 1969. The 
adjustment of stock prices to new information, In-
ternational Economic Review 10: 1–21. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/2525569
Fama, E. 1991. Efficient capital markets: II, Jour-
nal of Finance 46: 1575–1617. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x
Fama, E. F. 1998. Market efficiency, long-term returns, 
and behavioral finance, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 49: 283–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-
405X(98)00026-9
Färe, R.; Grosskopf, S.; Lovell, C. A. K. 1994a. Produc-
tion frontiers. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Färe, R.; Grosskopf, S.; Norris, M.; Zhang, Z. 1994b. Pro-
ductivity growth, technical progress and efficiency 
change in industrialized countries, American Eco-
nomic Review 84: 66–83.
Färe, R.; Grosskopf, S.; Roos, P. 1998. Malmquist pro-
ductivity indexes: a survey of theory and practice, 
in Färe, R.; Grosskopf, S.; Russell, R. R. (Eds.). In-
dex numbers: essays in honour of Sten Malmquist. 
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/978-94-011-4858-0_4
Farrell, M. J. 1957. The measurement of productive ef-
ficiency, Journal of Royal Statistical Society A 120: 
253–281. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2343100
Franks, J. R.; Harris, R. S. 1989. Shareholder wealth 
effects of corporate takeovers: the U.K. experience 
1955–1985, Journal of Financial Economics 23: 225–
249. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(89)90057-3
Healy, P. M.; Palepu, K. G.; Ruback, R. S. 1992. Does 
corporate performance improve after mergers?, 
Journal of Financial Economics 31: 135–175. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(92)90002-F
Jegadeesh, N.; Karceski, J. 2004. Long-run perfor-
mance evaluation: correlation and heteroskedas-
ticity consistent tests, Working Paper. Emory Uni-
versity.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, cor-
porate finance, and takeovers, American Economic 
Review 76: 323–329.
Kothari, S. P.; Warner, J. B. 2005. Econometrics of event 
studies, in Eckbo, B. E. (Ed.). Handbook of corporate 
finance. empirical corporate finance. Amsterdam: 
Elsevier/north-Holland.
Kortelainen, M. 2008. Dynamic environmental per-
formance analysis: a Malmquist index approach, 
Ecological Economics 64: 701–715. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2007.08.001
Lang, L. H. P.; Stulz, R. M.; Walking, R. A. 1989. Tobin’s 
Q and gains from successful tender offers, Journal 
of Financial Economics 24: 137–154. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/0304-405X(89)90075-5
Lang, L. H. P.; Stulz, R. M.; Walking, R. A. 1991. A test 
of the free cash hypothesis, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 29: 315–335. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-
405X(91)90005-5
Mitchell, M.; Stafford, E. 2000. Managerial decisions and 
long-term stock price performance, Journal of Busi-
ness 73: 287–329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/209645
Mitchell, M.; Pulvino, T.; Stafford, E. 2004. Price pres-
sure around mergers, Journal of Finance 58: 31–63. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00626.x
Servaes, H. 1991. Tobin’s Q and the gains from takeo-
vers, Journal of Finance 46: 409–419. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03758.x
Shepherd, R. W. 1970. Theory of cost and production 
functions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sudarsanam, S.; Holl, P.; Salami, A. 1996. Share-
holder wealth gains in mergers: effect of synergy 
and ownership structure, Journal of Business Fi-
nance and Accounting 23: 673–698. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.1996.tb01148.x
Zero2IPo group. 2011. Chinese real estate M&A deals 
from 2006 to 2011 (Jan to Feb), Zero2IPo Research 
Center, March 2011.
